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Unresolved Issues in Public Sector 
Bargaining in the 1980s 
A.W.R. Carrothers 
The paper falls under four main heads: 1) the environment of éduca-
tion in Canada, past, présent and future; 2) Public Service collective 
bargaining at the national level, including some observations on collective 
bargaining for teachers, keeping in mind the spécial interests of this au-
dience and your interest in the gênerai scène, at least for purposes of this 
early session; 3) options in the resolution of conflict; hère I propose to com-
ment first on characteristics of third party intervention, particularly as they 
may lead to binding arbitration, and then make comments and criticisms on 
emergency arbitration. There then foliows a conclusion the brevity of which 
will leave you in a state of disbelief. 
THE ENVIRONMENT OF EDUCATION 
Education in the 1960s 
I believe it was the first Annual Report of the Economie Council of 
Canada in the early '60s which presented the plinth of Education as the 
great hope for the future of Canada, particularly in terms of the économie 
advantages it offered and the spin-offs — if that cliché was then in use to 
classify derivative or side effects which may not always clearly be an-
ticipated and accounted for — of social well-being which those advantages 
portended. The présentation of thèse expectations coincided with political 
activity on the part of collège students which, at its most serious moments, 
sought to radicalize post-secondary institutions as a first and noble step in 
the pursuit of radical social transformation. We know that heads were 
broken, heads rolled, lives were lost and courses of lives were permanently 
altered. The institutions did not become outposts of radicalism, because 
they were not about to be deprived of their essential conservatism. 
But at the same time, governments were presented with two critical 
problems which were inévitable, in any case. One was the reorganization of 
educational structures to reflect current thinking on the twin issues of 
autonomy and accountability; and the other was the confrontation or rising 
costs, demands and expectations. 
Thèse explosions of actions, ideals and public reality — public mood 
may be a more accurate description, but not a passing mood — presented 
universities with problems, some of the more agonizing of which were (1) 
institutional responsibility for student behaviour; (2) the development of 
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programmes to serve the urgent demands of students; (3) hiring of faculty 
— some unqualified and some of them unqualifiable — to cope with the 
turmoil of programmes and enrolments; (4) the development of forms of 
university government which would préserve their autonomy within a 
suitable Framework of public accountability, while developing a style of in-
ternai decentralization appropriate to a multiversity without being caught in 
the snare of power without responsibility or accountability without control; 
(5) questions relating to the spécial field of research and the problems of 
identifying and rationalizing the appropriate rôles of universities, govern-
ments and the private sector; and (6) trying to cope with rivalries between 
the fraternal twins of access to éducation and access to jobs, a conflict 
which nurtures the very roots of the disillusionment in the educated youth 
of the work force. That, it may be well to remember, was a public legacy 
from the early '60s. 
Within the school System itself protrudes the Hall-Dennis Report, up-
dating the libéral philosophy of John Dewey of some thirty years' impact. 
Of even greater import was the Parent Commission's Report, which threw 
open the doors of learning for générations of beneficiaries in the Province 
of Québec, and became a major event in the strategy of the Quiet Révolu-
tion. 
One thing was known: throughout, we had démographie information 
about the baby boom of the early 1950s and the population bulge that hit 
the schools by the end of the '50s and the universities by the end of the '60s; 
and now the current minus population growth and population shifts that 
are causing the closing of schools in some areas and the construction of new 
institutions in so-called dormitory suburbs. You know better than I what 
this and a lot more mean for the teaching profession. 
Implications of the 1970s 
I turn now for a moment to the 1970s for dues that might lead us into 
bargaining issues relating to the 1980s. I shall be briefer hère because we are 
ail closer to the events. 
I enumerate them. 
— At the beginning of the '70s, there was a switch in public attitudes to 
éducation which coincided with (a) a falling enrolment, (b) rising 
educational costs which, projected only a few years, put them out of 
sight, and (c) a lowering of éducation as an item of public priority. 
There was a reinforced awareness of the relevance of the question of 
"the relevance of éducation for what?" 
— By 1975, the economy was in the midst of stagflation; people were 
planning their lives on how to get what they wanted now and to pay 
for it in cheapened dollars; and the anti-inflation programme came 
down upon us. (In 1974, in an address to a gathering of Fédéral 
public servants involved in the collective bargaining system, I sug-
gested that wage and price controls were on their way like a Sunday 
punch. The audience protested that wage controls would be iné-
quitable, and I ventured the surmise that in the eyes of the décision 
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makers equity would give way to efficacy. The audience then sought 
to hold me up by the hair as though I were a streetcar conductor per-
sonally responsible for the increase in transit fares). 
— There was a marked change in student attitude: students were now 
more serious about their studies than their predecessors of a few 
short years ago; there were more conformist; breeding and raising 
children was not high on their scale of demands, and governments 
were developing a much broader and, in my opinion, a much 
healthier range of educational offerings at the post-secondary level, 
providing a choice of realistic opportunities in compétition with the 
demonstrably elitist System of previous générations, and competing 
for limited educational dollars and for public praise. Those were the 
days of the dreadful slogan "More scholar for the dollar", and the 
educational politicians meant it. 
— This was the décade also in which the message of the demographers 
started to get through. It was a simple matter to project the existing 
population configuration for a couple of décades, and with a bit of 
imagination to project the rate of live births. Demographers ex-
pected the fertility rate, as they call it (the French term «natalité» at 
least de fers to the termination of pregnancy), to be less than required 
to reproduce our own kind — to maintain Canada's population level 
without a net immigration of something around 100,000 persons a 
year. As a footnote, which I promise you is figurative only, it may be 
observed that the revenge of the cradle had corne to an end. The 
birth rate in Québec dropped from the highest to the lowest in 
Canada, and Quebec's population as a percentage of Canada's as a 
whole dropped measurably. Few people seem to recognize the signif-
icance of this phenomenon in current manifestations of the continu-
ing crisis of national unity. But I encountered it personally at the 
senior political level, and it was articulate and spécifie. 
You know the litany of reactions among educators at ail levels: (1) how 
to maintain or raise the rétention rate of students in the educational System; 
(2) the broadening of programmes; (3) the advocacy of smaller classes; (4) 
the use of educational buildings for broader community purposes with the 
development of new rôles for educators. Thèse are but a few, and they are 
nurtured by the devil-god of économie insecuriy. 
Implications for the 1980s 
What are some of the implications of the foregoing for the 1980s? 
We seem to be heading for continuing stagnation; économie activity 
seems to be brighter in the area of takeovers than in économie growth. The 
population projections show a configuration for the next décade based on 
declining enrolments that will perpetuate the threat of économie insecurity 
in the educational profession. Political dissention can be expected to con-
tinue as a significant factor in our lives in gênerai and in the field of éduca-
tion in particular. 
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What are some of the implications for collective bargaining? 
Many people sensé a growing public disaffection with the right to strike 
in the field of éducation, strating particularly with a sensé of the victimiza-
tion of the young, and spreading out to include parents, taxpayers in 
gênerai, and governments who feel their priorities being dictated by the 
System. School boards and other governing bodies are being regarded as 
major trustées of public funds and the public interest in éducation, combin-
ed with a tragic érosion of the teacher as a committed privider of an essen-
tial public and human service. 
We know also the tensions that are being brought to the bargaining 
table, some a quite foreseeable inheritance from the anti-inflation pro-
gramme. I am thinking of the pressures created by claims to catch-up, the 
resulting whip-sawing and leap-frogging, and the phenomenon of income 
compression and inversion which are clear disincentives to accepting posi-
tions of responsibility and leadership. Turnover at senior administrative 
and policy-making levels can be foreseen, with loss of continuity, loss of in-
stitutional identity, and loss of a sensé of community, a quality which 
heretofore has placed a spécial and prideful mark on the world of éduca-
tion. 
We know that it will be no solution if, in confronting thèse unpleasant 
realities, teacher s were to become demoralized, for that would erode their 
commitment, impair performance, and préjudice their students. 
In search for ways and means for the effective management of thèse 
problems, I turn now to more spécifie topics, starting with the model of 
public sector collective bargaining at the national level. 
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Characteristics 
The main system of public service collective bargaining at the national 
level has a number of important characteristics, three of which I wish to em-
phasize hère. 
— Unions hâve an opportunity at regular intervais to opt for the right 
to strike or for terminal binding arbitration; 
— The Public Service Staff Relations Board can and does designate 
employées the maintenance of whose services is considered essential 
to the public interest; 
— There is very limited access to the courts for judicial review. 
As to the first, initially most public service unions opted for arbitra-
tion. In the mid '70s, for reasons which students of the System are still ex-
ploring, a number switched to the right to strike, but with no conséquent 
appréciable impact on the delivery of essential services to the public. Some 
hâve since switched back. 
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As for the désignation of employées, which is designed to continue 
essential services in the public interest, the process has severe critics. The 
harshest criticism is that designated employées are certified compulsory 
strike breakers with union tickets. 
As to the limitation of access to the courts, that is typical of modem 
labour législation; and I hâve the impression from reading the jurisprudence 
ant the literature that the courts consider themselves the beneficiaries of the 
constraints. 
Expédition 
A point that is raised strongly in favour of interest arbitration under 
the Public Service Staff Relations Act is that it is expeditious. Let me list the 
main reasons: 
— The System is voluntary; 
— The number of issues that may be arbitrated is very limited; 
— The statute provides criteria for the guidance of arbitrators and 
hence for the parties in the negotiation of items that may go to ar-
bitration; 
— The application of the criteria is backed by extensive data provided 
by the Pay Research Bureau, an independent body attached to the 
Public Service Staff Relations Board; 
— Certain information relating to the criteria is required of the parties 
in advance of the arbitration and is available from the Pay Research 
Bureau; 
— The process tends to be normative or quasi-judicial, applying stan-
dards of norms to data to reach an award, as distinct from being ac-
commodative, or seeking to function as an adjunct of collective 
bargaining and involving the parties as intimately as possible to 
reach an award acceptable to them; 
— No reasons are given; 
— The process is backed by a substantial administrative infrastructure; 
— There has now been 13 years' expérience with the System; 
— There are few and sophisticated unions and there essentially is one 
employer, the Treasury Board. This last point is made in contrast 
with the private sector, not with teacher arbitration processes. 
Criticisms 
The principal criticisms of arbitration in the Fédéral public service are 
almost a mirror image of the characteristics that make it expeditious: 
— The system should be more voluntary; 
— The range of arbitrable issues is too limited both by the statute and 
by a conservative arbitral interprétation of "disputes"; 
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— Pay Research Bureau data tend to be out of date in inflationary 
periods; 
— The arbitration board should not dictate the information which it 
considers relevant to the application of the statutory criteria; 
— The criteria are both too confining and too open-ended, leaving too 
much discrétion in the arbitration board; 
— The inference is that the arbitration board should be more accom-
modative and less normative in its approach; 
— Reasons should be given; 
— Treasury Board tries to impose "its way of doing things" in the 
détermination of relevant information; 
— There is little or no room for innovation; 
— Awards tend to be conservative and tend to favour management; 
— The process tends to shift the scène of action from the bargaining 
table to the arbitration hearing; 
— Parties who hâve been exposed to arbitration tend to become 
recidivists, what I later identify by the term the "narcotic effect" of 
third party intervention; 
— The arbitrators themselves tend to présent an upper middle-class 
profile and are remote from the work place. 
Response 
I offer the following in brief reply, not as a réfutation, but as a 
response. 
— Arbitrators are charged by statute with applying the policy of com-
parability. 
— It is essential to the System to ensure that information is useful. By 
way of analogy, if you are shown a photograph of a boy on a playing 
field, surrounded by other boys in identical clothing, with his foot 
out, and with a bail off the end of his boot, you may guess that they 
are playing football. If you are shown a séries of stills that represent 
the bail approaching and leaving the boy's boot, you may be able to 
surmise where the bail is going. If you are shown a motion picture of 
the incident you may hâve an opportunity of understanding the 
game. So it is with cross-section comparisons and trends of data in 
the game — the war game? — of disputes settlement (I don't care if 
you compare fifth quartiles, if the trends are accurate). 
— Centrifugal forces are built into the process of interest arbitration, 
and they must be held in check. 
— If an arbitration board is to be accommodative, one must recognize 
the time and expense which the process in volves, and must be 
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prepared to pay those costs; furthermore, the process requires 
thorough understanding by the arbitrator and the parties. 
— Reasons are not given because a tripartite board may agrée on an 
award but not on reasons. 
— If the System is not conducive to innovation, and if unions seek in-
novation — or breakthroughs — within the system of arbitration, as 
distinct from the potential use of the strike, it should not be surpris-
ing that on a count of issues the awards favour management. 
— Depending on one's concept and assessment of conservatism, the 
system and its results may be conservative; but they may be about as 
fair as third party intervention will allow. 
— The Fédéral public service embraces the so-called "common man" 
through to the most sophisticated professional. One could easily 
staff half a dozen universities from the présent Fédéral public ser-
vice, to use a phrase of Ernest Bevin's, from the dustman down to 
the Duke. 
— Unions still use arbitration, opting for it overwhelmingly — in over 
80% of the cases. 
— There is a recognized danger of substituting numbers for judgment, 
to produce bargaining by computer. 
— There is also the danger of pulling oneself up by one's bootstraps, 
through the overuse of arbitration resulting from what students of 
the system call the chilling and narcotic effects of intervention. 
Fédéral influence 
It may strike you as ironie that while 90% of Canada's labour force 
falls under the jurisdiction of provincial législation for collective bargaining 
purposes, the Fédéral model of interest arbitration is so influential. In addi-
tion, two Fédéral reports address the subject of disputes seulement. First, 
the Prime Munster's (Woods) Task Force on Labour Relations of 1969 
recommends spécial processes for addressing emergency disputes. The text 
of that report is now forming a model for provincial législation. The second 
is the report of a Commission of Inquiry, which reported in 1979, appointed 
by the Fédéral Minister of Labour to advise on the management of pro-
blems relating to redundancies and layoffs in the work force. The Commis-
sion, tripartite in structure, came down single-mindedly in support of a co-
opérative approach among employers, unions, employées, and government 
services in addressing thèse problems, to develop a programme to manage 
the problems so as to minimize their impact. It was not a case of latching 
onto models from Western Europe, where the union movement is more 
securely accepted as part of the socio-economic structure; there is clear 
évidence in this country that such co-operative endeavours are working, and 
in major industries. This country has had five Ministers of Labour since the 
Commission was appointed in 1978. But apart from législative reinforce-
ment, I reckon it may take half a décade, and I may be unduly optimistic, 
before this co-operative approach will hâve an observable impact on at-
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titudes in labour-management relations in gênerai and collective bargaining 
in particular. And recessions will doubtless produce setbacks. 
The Fédéral influence has always been strong. It started at the turn of 
the century, under Willian Lyon MacKenzie King. When the Privy Council 
in 1925 found Fédéral labour laws unconstitutional as falling within provin-
cial jurisdiction, many provinces then adopted those laws as a model. The 
same thing happened in 1947 when the Fédéral Government introduced a 
post-war labour code and left it for a year as a Bill, while many provinces 
adopted its main features as their own. 
Important provincial innovations hâve surfaced in comparatively ré-
cent years. 
Relationship to Collective Bargaining for Teachers 
What is the relationship of ail this to collective bargaining for teachers? 
I want to make two brief points. 
To begin with, the Fédéral System is a model from which much can be 
learned, to accept and reject. In this regard, I should like to comment on the 
system of teacher arbitration in British Columbia. It is compulsory. It is 
based de facto on comparability. There is agreement on criteria and data. 
The parties are sophisticated. There are rigid time constraints. The issues 
are limited. It has been observed that the system works because the results 
are acceptable, whereas in the arbitration of grievances the results are ac-
ceptable because the system works. 
Second, I venture the view that some difficulties in teacher collective 
bargaining stem from the dual rôle of your organizations. Teacher associa-
tions were first recognized by provincial législatures and granted union 
security as a means to preserving educational standards. They became col-
lective bargaining agents as collective bargaining took hold as social policy. 
When a school board, which may claim to be as close to the grass roots 
of educational policy as the association is, looks across the negotiating 
table, does it see the protector of educational standards, or does it see a col-
lective bargaining agent? Can it see both? It is not unheard of for a profes-
sion to hâve two organizations: one essentially an accrediting and disciplin-
ing body concerned with matters of standards, compétence and ethics, and 
the other a collective bargaining agent "pure and simple". 
ARBITRATION AS AN OPTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Is, then, arbitration a crédible option in conflict resolution as it relates 
to resolving issues in public service collective bargaining in the 1980s? 
As you know, collective bargaining and the right to strike are widely 
accepted public policy as a means to social justice and as an instrument of 
social and économie control. Governments move against it only when the 
public interest in the performance of service overwhelms the public interest 
in the right to act in concert and to withdraw services. Yet the record of ad 
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hoc législation in Canada imposing arbitration in place of the right to strike 
is impressive. The growing présence of or interest in standing législation in 
the area of emergency disputes should be noted, as it may relate to both the 
public and the private sectors of our socio-economic System. 
The right to strike in teachers prevails today in some form in ail but 
three provinces. But whatever may be the recommendations of the Ontario 
Commission of Inquiry into Teacher Bargaining, one may surmise that it 
was not appointed with the object of preserving the status quo. 
I turn, therefore, to making a few comments about some characteris-
tics of third party intervention leading to binding arbitration, and to a con-
sidération of emergency arbitration. 
Characteristics of Third Party Intervention leading to Binding Arbitration 
GENERAL 
— In our society, third party intervention in the settlement of collective 
bargaining disputes is very much a second-best solution to indepen-
dent settlement by bargain and agreement. 
— Interest arbitration is not limited to the public sector, and occurs on-
ly where the right to strike loses out in the political arena. Who is to 
décide to invoke the process? The parties? A government agency? 
Parliament? The Executive? 
— In the public sector in Canada, there is a considerably greater right to 
strike than in the United States. The impact of arbitration on the col-
lective bargaining process therefore has a character of its own, for 
there is not the same dependence on the process, and the expérience 
of others ought not to be assumed uncritically to hâve application 
hère. What the process has in common in the two countries is that it 
has become an acceptable alternative to work stoppage and to uni-
latéral action by employers and governments as employer. 
— Where third party intervention does occur, it seems to be most en-
lightened when it is regarded as an integrated part of collective 
bargaining, as ancillary to the process, or accommodative in nature, 
imitative of collective bargaining as far as may be possible. 
Having uttered a note of caution, I should like to refer to two processes 
of third party intervention with which there has been considérable ex-
périence in the United States. They may be considered generally appropriate 
to the management of collective bargaining problems in the 1980s and to 
teacher disputes in particular. 
Med-Arb 
The first is known colloquially as "med-arb", and is a combination of 
médiation and arbitration. Its prototype was known euphemistically as 
"médiation to finality,,; modem labour relations philosophers probably 
would like to call it "médiation to accommodation". The process is 
reasonably straight-forward, if sophisticated. The "intervener" starts as a 
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mediator and uses his talents to narrow the issues and bring the parties into 
agreement. Where agreement does not resuit, within such time constraints 
as may prevail, the mediator then becomes an arbitrator and makes a bin-
ding award. 
The mediator has spécial leverage in that he ultimately has power of ar-
bitration; the parties are not likely to give short attention to a proposai for 
settlement. It is equally important to note that the arbitrator is seized of in-
formation obtained in the confidentiality of médiation processes, without 
the knowledge of the other party and without probative evidentiary techni-
ques. 
Two conclusions should be noted. First is that the process requires un-
qualified confidence in the mediator and in the total process, if there is to be 
the candor and flexibility to make the médiation process work. Second is 
that the use in the quasi-judicial process of arbitration of évidence received 
in confidence in médiation, to the potential préjudice of either party, raises 
an important question of "due process". In my view, if med-arb is to be us-
ed in this country it should be supported by the Législature (or Parliament) 
as public policy and spelled out accordingly in législation. 
F.O.S. 
The second method of third party intervention with which the United 
States expérience may be enlightening is final offer sélection, or F.O.S., 
sometimes known as forced choice arbitration. 
You are probably quite familiar with the process, because it is provided 
as an option by législation in Ontario, and has been used a number of times 
at the Ùniversity of Alberta. It may hâve appeared elsewhere in Canada. 
The Ontario scheme is a typical model. The parties deliver their posi-
tions to the * Selector'', who functions as a kind of postal exchange at this 
point, to pass on the respective positions of the parties. The parties then 
prépare their final offers on each item in dispute. The Selector, presumably 
after a hearing in which the parties défend their positions, must sélect one 
package or the other, in total. 
I hâve strong réservations about F.O.S., for three reasons: (1) it is bas-
ed on fear; (2) there is no room for any real intellectual exercise of judgment 
between right and wrong or, more properly, between competing rights and 
claims; and (3) there is a palpable risk of bad spin-offs or side-effects. 
— As to the élément of fear, it is quite clear that the object of F.O.S. is 
to make each party move toward the centre and hopefully settle the 
dispute without third party intervention out of fear that it will lose 
the sélection. I find it very hard to reconcile the blatant use of the 
sanction of fear in the process of third party intervention in the set-
tlement of labour-management disputes with the term public policy. 
The élément of fear may intrude into any process, but that is dif-
férent from deliberately building it into the process from the beginn-
ing. 
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— As to the exercise of judgment, the Selector may, on the basis of 
reliable and cogent data relating to each item in dispute, conclude 
that his judgment dictâtes a reconciliation of the issues on terms 
which neither party proposes in its final offer; that intellectually un-
comfortable position of the Selector is aggravated by the fact that he 
must sélect a total package. 
— As to the bad spin-offs, the Selector may décide to favour the 
package of one party because its position on Item One cornes closest 
to the arbitrator's judgment. The arbitrator may in advance décide 
that item to be the critical one, or he may reach that conclusion after 
examining the offers and concluding that the position of the other 
party on that item is so far out that the Selector cannot underwrite it. 
There may be four more items on which the arbitrator may prefer the 
position of the second party, but which, according to the System, 
must fall to the first. The Selector may thus décide that it is the lesser 
of two evils to allow the first party to win the pot on one good posi-
tion and four bad ones than to allow the second party to win on an 
unacceptable position on the first item although it is the more 
meritorious on the next four. The parties are then left to live for the 
duration of the collective agreement with inéquitable results in four 
issues and to try to straighten out the mess in the next round of 
negotiations. The process, as I understand it, especially with the 
feature of "winner take ail , fails utterly to leave room to take into 
account that there can be sensitive trade-offs within an issue and bet-
ween issues, as I hâve already observed. 
That is why, by way of the above example, I hâve on other occasions 
referred to F.O.S. as "the-least-lousy-position arbitration", and that is why 
I hâve difficulty in reconciling the éléments of fear, chance and inequity 
with the term public policy. 
Incidentally, an article written not too long ago on the University of 
Alberta expérience indicates that over a period of years (the author uses the 
term "inter-temporal"), the Selector favours one side on one occasion and 
the other side the next. Perhaps the System does equity, or perforais in-
dustrial justice, over time by balancing inequities. 
A variant of the example given above is to allow the Selector to choose 
item by item. Another possible variant would be to allow the parties to 
review their positions and freshen their offers after each sélection is made. 
Ghosts in the Arbitration Process 
I should like now to address the topic of ghosts in the arbitration pro-
cess as a characteristic of third party intervention. 
There are two circumstances in which one can feel the présence of 
ghosts. 
— The first is at the bargaining table and in arbitration, especially 
where an accommodative approach is taken to arbitration, where 
one or both parties are accountable to principals who hâve so in-
structed the negotiators or représentatives that they hâve little, if 
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any,room to manoeuvre. The ghost may be less obvious on the 
employer's side, but that may be because, by the nature of union 
politics, the union's instructions may be the product of public or 
quasi-public meetings; further, in bargaining, the negotiators hold in 
reserve the ratification vote and their own recommendations to the 
membership on the acceptance or rejection of an offer. But the 
employer's negotiators or représentatives may also hâve their hands 
tied and may hâve to seek new instructions from their principals 
from time to time. Not every request for an adjournment should be 
assumed to be a response to a call of nature. 
Thèse ghosts affect the positions of the parties and what is presented 
to the arbitrator. 
— The second circumstances of the présence of the ghost is in the im-
pact of the décision of the arbitrator. Assuming that arbitration is 
binding at law, and assuming that the arbitrator makes a décision on 
cost items, his décision affects public priorities, including the quality 
of éducation, through the allocation of limited public resources. 
For example, a salary increase in a school board arbitration affects 
the allocation of funds by the school board and consequently the 
configuration of budgets of the schools within the district. Where 
moneys must be recovered from a Municipal Government, the Muni-
cipality's priorities are directly affected. Where the funds are raised 
by an increase in the mill rate, the taxpayers' priorities are affected. 
Where moneys are recoverable by the school board from the Provin-
cial Government, that Government's budgeting is affected, and 
within the Ministry of Education and among Ministries in the com-
pétition for funds. That, in turn, can effect claims to tax transfers 
from the central government and to its exercise of control over its 
funds available for research and development, two functions critical 
to the économie welfare of the country and functions performed to a 
very high degree in educational institutions that are créatures of pro-
vincial législation. (I observed on another occasion and in another 
context that Canada proves it is possible to govern a country which is 
impossible to govern.) 
It may be observed that arbitrators' décisions on that same issue 
doubtless affect priorities of domestic spendings as well. 
Arbitrators are quite aware of their ectoplasmic qualities; but that 
awareness may do little more than heighten their sensé of the nature 
of the assignment they hâve undertaken. Observers of the phenome-
non of interest arbitration should not overlook it. 
Emergency Arbitration, Comments and Criticisms 
— Emergency arbitration tends to be ad hoc, has been used extensively 
in Canada, both federally and provincially, is involuntary, and oc-
curs in situations of a high level of tension. The process may not be 
political, but the atmosphère is likely to be highly charged politically. 
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The data used in emergency arbitration tend to be " dealer 's choice", 
unsophisticated, and riddled with evidentiary problems. 
Criteria are rarely spelled out in the législation except in the most 
gênerai terms. 
If the arbitrât or opts for an accommodative approach, the process 
can be time-consuming, and people should be prepared for it. Fur-
thermore, as observed before, as a character of third party interven-
tion at large, the process involves trade-offs both within issues and 
among issues. 
The process may be affected by the kind of board that is appointed. 
A one-man board may be faster. A tripartite board may be more ac-
commodative, but it is likely to be more political and the rôles of the 
three members may be slippery, inasmuch as they may be less easily 
defined and maintained. 
Centrifugal forces are bound to be at work, eroding the reliability of 
data and challenging the focus of issues. 
Lawyers may very well be involved; their relative utility or disutility 
dépends on their understanding of the nature of labour-management 
disputes settlement and the kind of processes within which they must 
work. 
If ad hoc législation is foreseeable there may be no real bargaining — 
that is what is currently called the chilling effect of intervention. 
The union, especially if it is a large national organization, may not 
be able to develop clear priorities for its members as a whole, and 
may thus find the process internally disruptive. 
CONCLUSION 
At a récent seminar in Vancouver on the subject of interest arbitration, 
Prof essor Charles Morris, a highly distinguished American scholar, teacher 
and industrial relations practitioner, put the foliowing thematic question: 
"Collective bargaining has altered the governmental process... How can 
that altération be structured to assure not only that collective bargaining 
will be compatible with the démocratie process, but also responsive to the 
legitimate needs of ail the parties?" 
As a more spécifie focus to that penetrating question, I should like to 
restate the folio wing, at least as a partial response: "Short of radical trans-
formation in our industrial relations System, voluntary binding arbitration 
appears to be the most plausible alternative to the work stoppage. We must 
seek to improve processes, to ensure that as a matter of course, and not rely-
ing on the discrétion of the parties or the personal style of any particular ar-
bitrator, the quasi-judicial process, whether normative or accommodative, 
will be made to work at an optimal level of sophistication, and will be seen 
so to work." 
"The job must be done." 
